INTRODUCTION
Along the trajectory of any juridical evolution, a country is certain to run into the need for amendments and revisions as it realizes that its initial plan for implementation is unlikely to both effectuate the legal end sought and assuage the reservations of those involved and affected.
Examples of such transitions include the end of apartheid politics in South Africa, the shift from communism to democratic political systems in Eastern Bloc countries, and the emergence of the 
Service Users (Ley de Protección y Defensa de Servicios Financieros).
6 Although this note focuses strictly on the effect of this legislation on environmental protection, legislative recognition of such actions will also have an impact in numerous additional areas, such as consumer protection, economic competition, urban development and Mexican cultural property. 7 This Note holds that implementation of collective actions in Mexico provides substantial improvements for citizen and governmental redress of environmental problems. However, the legal structure ratified for implementation lacks the economic incentives needed to completely effectuate the change sought by congressional intent as it opens avenues to institutional actors by which neglecting Mexican law can be the most economically efficient outcome.
Therefore, the argument advanced by this Note is that clarifications must be made to this amendment, through either Jurisprudencias or Ejecutorias, 8 expansive judicial interpretation in 5 See Decree, supra note 2. 6 See Decree, supra note 2. 7 See Decree, supra note 2. the coming years or additional legislative amendments, all of which could allow additional parameters to ensure the unassailable environmental and constitutional rights of Mexican citizens. Mexico has made significant progress in addressing environmental law issues over the past forty years. However, additional substantive changes are necessary to ensure that citizens' environmental rights are not subordinated to institutional economic interests. It is the opinion of this Note that the most effectual vehicle for accomplishing such change is through the implementation of additional economic damages with regard to collective actions in Mexico, similar to the notion of punitive damages in American jurisprudence.
Part I introduces the legislative amendments that provide for collective actions, the legal repercussions of the action and the legal argument proposed by this Note. Part II outlines
Mexico's legal system with particular attention paid to environmental law and its evolution over the past century. Part III addresses the recent amendment made to Article 17 of the Mexican Constitution (hereinafter "Article 17," unless otherwise noted), 9 which allows for class actions through a number of additions and amendments to existing federal law, focusing on a number of significant changes to the nation's legal system. Part IV distinguishes the procedural and substantive aspects of the Mexican collective action system from the American system. Part V analyzes the economic consequences of this amendment. Part VI discusses some of the major complications of this new juridical regime and proposes possible solutions to ensure that the new Although contemporaneous with the environmentalism movement in the United States, the environmentalism movement in Mexico did not embrace the notion of "free-market environmentalism" at this time. Free-market environmentalism is a position that argues the free market, property rights, and tort law provide the best tools to preserve the health and sustainability of the environment. 29 This contrasts with the theory of state intervention to protect the environment-the most common modern approach in civil law countries like Mexico.
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Perhaps the most ubiquitous implementation of free-market environmentalism is the use of "class action" or "collective action" lawsuits. These legal mechanisms have been used across the world to redress environmental issues. 31 However, until the dawn of the 21st century, Mexico resisted any attempt to implement a legal regime that allowed the use of such legal mechanisms.
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This period noticeably differed from the previous one in that it was the first time in
Mexican legal history in which substantive legislative efforts were made to contend with environmental issues. During this period, the nation followed the lead of the United States and implemented legislative measures reflecting the concerns of the environmentalism movementclean air, clean water, conservation, etc. 33 The end of this period did not mark a lull in 28 33 The Federal Government of Mexico, through the Secretariat of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fishing (Secretaría de Medio Ambiental, Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP)), has sole jurisdiction over those acts that effect two or more states, acts that include hazardous waste, and procedures for the protection and control of acts that can cause environmental damage or serious emergencies to the environment. The Secretariat's main activities are to make environmental policy and enforce it; assist in urban planning; develop rules and technical standards for the environment; grant (or deny) licenses, authorizations and permits; decide on environmental impact studies; and grant opinions on and assist the states with their environmental programs. This Secretariat enforces the legislative action concerning environmental matters; rather, the distinction between this period of Mexican environmental legal history and the subsequent one was predicated on the economic implications of environmental legislation.
C. The Era of Free-Market Environmentalism in Mexico (2008-Present)
Over the past few years, Mexico has been increasingly reticent to promulgate environmental regulations. 34 Recently, Mexico's deterrence mechanisms with regard to environmental law have begun to focus their impetus on economic incentives rather than legal regulation.
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This Note refers to this sea change as the beginning of free-market environmentalism in Mexico.
These amendments are emblematic of the change from regulation to free-market environmentalism to preserve the health and sustainability of the environment. They allow for collective actions and provide guidelines for their regulation and procedural implementation, as has been done in other countries in the Americas, such as the United States, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Venezuela. 36 Collective actions seek to aggregate the rights of a group of persons for their defense in group litigation. 37 The various rights of the members of a group are considered collective in the strict sense of individuals in a collective group according to a ruling on the propriety of a collective action, and whether or not there are common circumstances to permit linking all the individuals together for their common protection or defense. 39 The Chamber of Deputies bill was introduced in
July 2010 by Representative Javier Corral Jurado of the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional) -the governing party at the time. 40 This bill would give a number of public officials and entities the requisite standing to file collective actions, including the President, the Attorney General, municipalities, public prosecutors, and civil and consumer associations, as well as any individual in Mexico. 41 This bill proposed no class certification or admissibility rules. 42 Under this bill, a defendant would be given ten days to respond to a complaint, which would be followed by a short evidentiary phase. 43 The judge would then decide the case based on its merits within ninety days. to protect a group linked by a contractual relationship. 52 The opt-out procedure presented in the early drafts of Senator Murillo's bill was replaced by a mixed system under which it is possible to opt out of collective actions if they involve diffuse rights and opt in if they involve collective rights or individual homogeneous rights.
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Accompanying the above amendments was the introduction of a clear certification phase with familiar criteria, such as commonality, adequate representation, class definition and superiority. 54 These included rules that provide for parties' right to appeal the trial court's certification ruling. 55 In addition, the "loser pays" rule was adopted and attorney's fees were subject to caps that aim at avoiding abuse. 56 In late December 2010, the revised Murillo bill was approved unanimously in committee and, shortly thereafter, by the Senate's Plenary Assembly. In Mexico, as in other civil law jurisdictions, the procedures for collective actions do not necessarily resemble the procedures used in common law countries. The following part will juxtapose Mexico's nascent group litigation system with the long-established common law system implemented in the United States. 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF GROUP LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO PECUNIARY DAMAGES
Much like the way class action addresses the legal mechanism of remediation for a group of litigants in the United States, the term 'collective action' encompasses group litigation in
Mexico. This part will discuss the procedural and substantive aspects of group litigation in these countries, setting aside the possibility of injunctive relief and focusing on the pecuniary damages as set forth in the substantive laws of both the United States and Mexico. The respective differences in the procedural and substantive aspects of group litigation will serve as a point of reference throughout this Note and in regard to the possible solutions proposed in Part VI.
A. The Procedural Aspects of Group Litigation
In As previously explained, these provisions became effective March 1, 2012. 71 Legal scholars and commentators are still unsure as to how courts will apply the statutory requirements in other unpredictable situations. Mexican academics and jurists have speculated as to what the criteria of the courts will be for the plaintiffs in such a scenario in which one develops a harm or injury outside the statutory limit. However, the answer to this question will only become apparent once federal judges encounter such situations in the coming months and years.
In both the United States and Mexico, the procedure for filing a class action is to file suit with one or several named plaintiffs on behalf of a proposed class. 72 The proposed class must consist of a group of individuals or business entities that have suffered a common injury or injuries. 73 After filing a complaint, the plaintiff must certify the class. 74 The procedure of class certification differs in the United States and Mexico. The following paragraphs will address the procedural requirements for class certification in both the United States and Mexico.
Class Certification in the United States
Class certification is the determination by a judge that a group of individuals has met both the requirements set forth in Rule 23 and an initial motion to dismiss it on the merits.
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Such a ruling is necessary to ensure judicial economy and to guarantee that courts are not inundated with meritless lawsuits. Therefore, in the United States, Rule 23 requires that the plaintiff demonstrate adequacy, numerosity, commonality and typicality.
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The requirement of adequacy in a class action provides for ensuring that the representative parties adequately protect the interests of the class. claims or defenses of the class." 91 Unlike numerosity and commonality, which focus on the characteristics of the class, typicality and adequacy of representation focus on the characteristics of the plaintiff representative of the class. 92 Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative and not to the specific facts from which it arose or to the relief sought. Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based on the same legal theory. 93 As the Supreme Court has explained, "The typicality requirement is said to limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiffs'
claims." 94 The typicality analysis asks, "whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same conduct." 95 Having met the abovementioned four criteria gives a group seeking redress in the United
States legal standing. Mexico, as a civil law country, differs somewhat in the system its legislature has passed for class certification. The required elements of class certification in Mexico will be addressed in the following subsection. At this time, Mexico has yet to rule on collective action litigation. 98 Therefore, it is uncertain how Mexican federal judges will apply these standards. However, the guidelines set forth in the amendment to Article 586 seem to set rigid guidelines that ensure that group litigants are provided with diligent representatives as must be the case to ensure the effective organization for legal redress to affected citizens.
Class Certification in Mexico
The Decree amends Article 588 of the Mexican Civil Code of Procedure to illustrate the requirement of commonality. 99 As in American jurisprudence, commonality in Mexico is statutorily defined as the presence of one or more common legal or factual claims. 100 It will be interesting to see how Mexican judges interpret this commonality requirement in the months and years to come. The Decree also mandates that a collective action may only be certified if it demonstrates superiority, or that the group litigation mechanism is deemed the most efficient method to address the legal issue. 
Substantive Aspects Regarding the Issuance of Pecuniary Damages in the Context of Group Litigation in the United States
As a result of Erie, federal courts in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. This was incongruous with the past procedure sanctioned previously Misconduct that is more reprehensible justifies a larger punitive damage award, just as a repeat offender in criminal law may be punished with a tougher sentence.
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This subsection has identified the current substantive law behind pecuniary damages in the context of American class actions. The following subsection will introduce the specifics underlying the issuance of such damages in Mexican collective actions.
Substantive Aspects Regarding the Issuance of Pecuniary Damages in the Context of Group Litigation in Mexico
Impelled by the promulgation of the amendment to Article 17, Article 603 et seq. of the Decree amending the Federal Code of Civil Procedure addresses the substantive law behind the pecuniary and injunctive judgments (sentencias) of collective actions in Mexico. In diffuse actions, the judge may order the defendant to repair the damage caused to the community.
129
This compensation may include performing one or more actions or refrain from doing. 130 If this is not possible, the judge shall order substitute performance (cumplimiento sustituto) according to the infringement of the rights or interests of the community. 131 In the case of collective actions and homogeneous individual rights collective actions, the judge may order the defendant to repair the damage, consisting of the realization of one or more actions or refraining from doing such actions, and to cover damages individually to group members as provided in this article. 132 Only if this option is not possible will the judge defer to the issuance of pecuniary damages. 133 In such a case, whether a diffuse action, collective action or homogeneous individual rights collective action, the reparation to the plaintiff community is the samecompensatory damages.
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Under Mexican jurisprudence, the vast majority of these compensatory damages issued are likely to come under the guise of "damages and losses" (daños y perjuicios). consequences of non-compliance. 135 Article 2104 of the Mexican Civil Code states "Whoever is obligated to perform an act and fails to do so or performs such act without conforming to what was agreed, will be responsible for the loss of profit (lucrum cessans)." Article 2107 of said
Code further establishes, "[t]he type of responsibility referred in this Title, will imply the return of the goods or the price, or the repair of the damages and the indemnification of the prejudices." 136 Articles 2108 and 2109 define "compensatory damages" and "loss of future earnings," respectively, as follows: "compensatory damage is the loss or decrease of assets suffered as a result of the failure to comply with an obligation" and "lost profits are the deprivation of lawful gains that would have resulted had there been compliance with an obligation." 137 Moreover, Article 2110 states that "Damages and losses shall be an immediate and direct consequence resulting from the breach of the obligation, either caused or that had to be necessarily caused."
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Although the Mexican application of damages relies only on the above-mentioned provisions, the system is likely to change as the practice of issuing damages for sanctions begins in 2012. In the forthcoming part, this Note will examine the implications and make judges and legislators cognizant of the effects of Mexico's practice of issuing damages in the absence of any juridical or legislative action. This will provide a practical guide for those on the frontlines of these cases to ensure that justice is accomplished with respect to the consumer and the environment in the formative stages of collective actions in Mexico.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 17 OF THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
With the provisions described in Part III, the Federal Congress in Mexico pieced together a collective action model intended to protect the interests of numerous stakeholders. However, to this point, it is largely academic to speculate as to the implications the amendment will have on corporate and individual action. Prior to the amendment of Article 17, the legal mechanism of group litigation was foreign to Mexico's civil law system. Nevertheless, inferences regarding the applicability of Mexico's existing statutory provisions are the best available resources to speak to the consequences of Mexico's actions regarding collection actions. Part V uses this information to draw conclusions primarily on the economic implications of the aforementioned legislative amendment to Article 17. However, it does bear noting that given the newness of the Decree, many of the opinions and projections addressed within this section are projections that are more speculative than authoritative assertions.
As addressed in Part III, the amendment to Article 17 published to the Official Gazette on August 30, 2011, provides for a system that limits damages a successful plaintiff may recover for the costs of remediating the harm or injury incurred. Under the legislation passed by the Mexican Congress, plaintiffs in a collective action may seek no additional pecuniary damages.
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This is a stark contrast to the legal structure for collective actions provided by many common law countries. For example, in the United States, it is permissible for a plaintiff to seek additional pecuniary damages in such an action. 140 The most emblematic of these damages is the award of punitive damages. 139 Punitive damages are damages intended to reform or deter the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar to that which formed the basis of the lawsuit. 141 Oftentimes, this is the impetus behind punitive damages, with punitive damages often being awarded when compensatory damages are deemed an inadequate remedy. 142 Since they are usually paid in excess of the plaintiff's provable injuries, punitive damages are awarded only in special cases, usually under tort law, in cases in which the defendant's conduct was egregiously insidious. 143 However, the court may also impose them to prevent under-compensation of plaintiffs, to allow redress for undetectable torts and to take some strain away from the criminal justice system. 144 Although the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, the plaintiff will in fact receive all or some portion of the punitive damage award. The lack of the option to pursue punitive damages within the Mexican legal system raises the possibility that the Mexican system may provide too little of an economic incentive to affect corporate behavior.
See generally Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, as amended
Consider a maquiladora 145 that produces LCD televisions. In Mexico, many maquiladoras lack proper waste management facilities and the ability to clean up disposal sites, which is why some of the hazardous waste is disposed of illegally. 146 These maquiladoras may dump their waste into rivers or landfills where the hazardous toxins will seep into nearby aquifers and contaminate the local water supply. This is but one hypothetical scenario that would both affect a given population and particular environment. Under Mexico's newly enacted legislation, the affected population may file a collective action seeking pecuniary damages for the harm or injury incurred as a result of the environmental tort. Suppose the maquiladora saved more in its illegal disposal of the waste than the damages sought by the plaintiffs in their collective action. In such case, the maquiladora has no incentive to cease its illegal behavior without the imposition of some sort of additional damages award. Thus, the maquiladora will avoid economic inefficiency by continuing to dispose of materials illegally. actors seeking only increased profits. These changes need not necessarily embody the philosophy of American jurisprudence, but can build upon the economic incentives used to modify institutional behavior in the changes that Mexico will make in the coming years. The potential of these aims will be the focus of the discussion in Part VI.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPLICATIONS POSED BY THE CURRENT JURIDICAL SYSTEM
In 1979 At the time of this publication, Mexico is quite unfamiliar with the system of group litigation and this system could easily take a period of five years for Mexican courts to become accustomed with this nascent area of law. This means that Mexican group litigation in the coming years is likely to be both scarce and tentative.
Collective actions are essentially the incarnation of the American class action. This is a new, foreign area within Mexican law. Therefore, the Mexican federal government and federal judiciary are likely to be initially ignorant of the niceties involved in such litigation. Currently, Mexican judges and jurists have no sources to consult and therefore could be reticent in handling cases and rendering the first decisions in the coming years. It is also likely that the first decisions will be incomplete or imperfect because of this lack of experience. Therefore, many of these decisions will be challenged through the recurso de amparo, a Mexican legal mechanism established to protect the constitutional rights of individuals and companies against violations from public authorities. 152 This Note argues that to ensure an efficient system of group litigation in Mexico, three requisite factors must be present: quality judges abreast of the nascent system of collective actions, lawyers trained in collective action procedure and litigation, and outstanding scientific experts.
A. Description. 159 In his initiative proposing for the creation of the Council, President Zedillo stated:
In order to elevate in the future, the professional quality of those who will have to impart justice, this reform aspires to raise to a constitutional rank the judicial career, so in the future the appointment, description and removal of judges and magistrates will be subject to general, objective and impartial criteria to be determined by the laws on this matter. 160 is in charge of the "research, development, training and updating of the members of the Federal Judicial Power, and of those who aspire to belong to it." 161 The Institute may employ support programs from regional offices (extensiones regionales) with the possibility of assistance from Mexican universities; these programs serve to benefit federal judges in their constitutional mandate to timely resolve the matters of which is the subject of this Note. 162 The Institute of the Judiciary has the support of an Academic Committee (Comité Académico), 163 with the ability to implement "programs and courses" designed:
1) To develop a practical knowledge regarding the procedures and matters under the jurisdiction of the Council of the Federal Judiciary; 2) To perfect certain technical skills; 3) To strengthen and specialize in matters dealing with the applicable law, doctrine and jurisprudence (jurisprudencia); 4) To perfect techniques on legal analysis, interpretation and argumentation; 5) To teach administrative techniques relating to the jurisdictional function; 6) To develop legal vocations in favor of a judicial career, and the ethical values associated with it; and, 7) To promote academic exchanges with institutes of higher education. 164 Given the importance, originality, and complexity of these new collective actions, it may be prudent for the Mexican Congress to require the Federal Council of the Judiciary to administer a course and require members of the federal judiciary interested in participating in these actions to attend. This could help mitigate some of the potential problems that may occur in the presence of an inexperienced judiciary.
The Role of Federal Judges in Collective Action Litigation
As the idea of group litigation is novel to Mexico, federal judges must be prudent in the issuance of decisions during the initial years of implementation of collective actions. Since
Mexico does not adhere to the principle of stare decisis, 165 the significance of case law in Mexico is secondary compared to the importance given to the legal principle, rule, or norm found in the applicable provision of a given statute or code. 166 As a result, great significance will be placed on the applicability of legal principles employed in the litigation of collective actions.
As illustrated in the preceding part, the economic implications of the these forthcoming amendments and additions create situations in which it may be economically efficient to violate the law and pay compensatory damages to replace what the plaintiffs were objectively determined by a judge or jury to have lost, and nothing more. American jurisprudence implements punitive damages to punish a defendant for his or her conduct as a deterrent to the future commission of such acts. Such damages are likely to eliminate the economic incentive to intentionally violate one's legal obligations. In Mexico, remunerations analogous to punitive damages are likely to be implemented only in cases of egregiously insidious behaviors. 167 Under
Mexican jurisprudence, the vast majority of damages issued in any sort of reparation are likely to come under the guise of "damages and lost profits" (daños y perjuicios). v. Gore, 171 which held that additional pecuniary damages must be reasonable and determined by the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that caused the plaintiff's injury. 172 This is the most administratively feasible option for members of the Mexican judicial system to eliminate the presence of such "efficient breaches" of citizens' constitutional rights in the coming years.
To guarantee the intent of the amendments and additions of the Decree are fulfilled, that individual constitutional rights are not alienated or subordinated to institutional economic interests, Mexico must implement a system of damages similar to the American system that punishes activities antithetical to the constitutional environmental rights of its citizens. This change need not be the issuance of "punitive damages" or the result of legislative action if
Mexican judges begin to interpret Articles 2104 et seq. of the Civil Code more expansively and incorporate additional damages. If such a system may not be executed through the expansive reading of the relevant portions of the Mexican Civil Code, then it is the prerogative of the federal government to pass legislation that allows for the implementation of an equivalent arrangement. The inability to accomplish these juridical changes will fail to realize the intent of both the Decree, to fulfill the lacuna legis or lacuna lex of the citizens of Mexico, and the didactic purpose of the recent amendment of Article 4, the right of all persons to an adequate environment for their development and well-being, by placing institutional interests above the constitutional rights of the Mexican public.
B. The Role of Mexican Lawyers in Collective Action Litigation
As mentioned in Part IV, the Decree amends Article 586 of the Mexican Civil Code of Procedure to define adequate representation for group litigation in Mexico. The above analysis mentioned that Mexico has yet to rule on this aspect of collective action litigation. 173 The standards set forth in the amendment to Article 586 would seem to set rigid guidelines that ensure that group litigants are provided with diligent representatives as must be the case to ensure an effective organization for legal redress to affected citizens. However, because an ineffective representative is as deleterious as anything is to a plaintiff or defendant, federal judges must be sure that this article is strictly enforced. Like the United States, Mexico respects the principles of res judicata and allows only one attempt to resolve any collective action.
Accordingly, it is paramount that Mexican lawyers approach collective actions, or any action, diligently to prevent the possibility of preclusion.
C. The Role of Scientific Experts in Collective Action Litigation
Numerous studies have documented the significant role that science plays as a tool in group litigation to substantiate claims and corroborate the validity of pecuniary damages. 174 Scientific data and expert testimony are often included to buttress a claim and the admissibility of such evidence is often a consequence of the extant evidentiary rules and their application. 175 In the United States as well as in many other countries, expert witnesses are at once detested and treasured. 176 "Experts are seen as mercenaries, prostitutes, or hired guns, witnesses devoid of principle who sell their opinions to the highest bidder." 177 However, this scorn is mitigated by the imperative function such scientific testimony plays in both its evidentiary role and the calculus of settlement.
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In Mexico, the pervasiveness of expert witnesses is not as widespread as it is within the United States. Simple demand-side economics would suggest that the paucity of legal decisions requiring experts in Mexico would suggest that the country might not have the quantity or be prepared to supply the qualified experts for such legal expertise. Mexico will need to deal with this inefficiency in the coming years -either by contracting with foreign experts or catalyzing the development of such experts in response to the need posed by collective actions.
Addressing the lack of expert witnesses, as well as addressing and training quality judges and lawyers in order to comply with the recent requirements of collective actions in Mexico is essential to the development of an efficient system of group litigation in Mexico.
VII. CONCLUSION
It does not suffice to recognize simply the constitutional right to a healthy environment; it is necessary to admit functional procedural legitimation to ensure these rights are provided, regardless of the desires of powerful institutional economic interests. This Note has discussed the insufficiency and inefficacy of the Mexican legal system, on its face value, for the protection of collective environmental rights. This Note has emphasized the need for the Mexican judiciary to allow for a more expansive reading of Articles 2104 et seq. of the Mexican Civil Code, or for the Mexican Congress to add additional parameters to implement and strengthen its vision to effectively protect the unassailable constitutional rights of its citizens.
Mexico has made significant progress in addressing environmental law issues through free-market environmentalism. However, the Mexican Congress must make substantive amendments to the nation's legal system to ensure that the environmental rights of citizens, guaranteed by the Mexican Constitution, are not subordinated to institutional economic interests.
This Note advances the idea that the primary, most effectual vehicle for implementing such change is through the introduction of additional pecuniary damages with regard to collective actions in Mexico.
